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Abstract
Rapidly growing developing economies have exported heavily and run current ac-
count surpluses. Empirical studies suggest that "learning-by-exporting" may be quan-
titatively large in developing countries and behind some of this dramatic growth. This
paper explores if learning-by-exporting helps explain the key macroeconomic behavior
of fast growing developing countries. It builds up a two country general equilibrium
growth model in which a developing economy benets from learning-by-exporting as
it trades with a developed economy. As the benchmark, I consider a setup in which
the policies are restricted to non-trade related ones by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and compare it to a model with "No-WTO restrictions". The optimal policies
in the presence of WTO restrictions rationalize the observed current account surpluses
of rapidly growing developing economies. However, if there were no WTO restrictions,
the developing countries would manipulate their terms of trade rather than their cur-
rent account, which improves the welfare of both developing and developed countries.
This highlights the fact that terms of trade manipulation can be "win-win" in the
presence of learning-by-exporting. This paper also considers a "Coordinated Policy"
problem to obtain the rst-best outcomes for the world. In this setup, the developing
countrys terms of trade deteriorate even more and it runs a greater current account
decit relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
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1 Introduction
Rapidly growing developing economies like China and other Asian countries have exported
heavily1 and run current account surpluses2. The fast growth accompanied by current ac-
count surpluses contradicts the prediction of the open-economy neoclassical growth model
that countries with faster productivity growth should receive more net capital inows to fund
investment and consumption smoothing. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) name it the "allo-
cation puzzle". These fast growing countriescurrent account surpluses contribute to the
worldwide current account imbalances, so-called "global imbalances". Since these economies
have exported heavily, a popular view is that export-led growth may be behind some of
these dramatic Asian miracles. This is supported by empirical studies which suggest that
"learning-by-exporting" (exportersproductivity improvement accompanied by increased ex-
ports) may be quantitatively large in developing countries. This paper takes the popular
view seriously and attempts to explore if learning-by-exporting helps explain the key macro-
economic behavior of fast growing developing countries. This paper also examines what
policies exploit learning-by-exporting, their implications for aggregates like the current ac-
count and the real exchange rate, the welfare consequences for the growing economy and the
rest of the world, and if restricting the set of policies to non-trade related policies matter.
In order to answer these questions, this paper builds up a two country general equilibrium
growth model in which a developing economy benets from learning-by-exporting as it trades
with a developed economy. This positive externality in the developing countrys export
provides it with an incentive to increase export. The model is calibrated to match relevant
data moments of the U.S. and China in 1991 and simulated for a transition to a steady
state. As the benchmark, I consider a setup in which the policies are restricted to non-
1See Figure 1.
2See Figure 2.
2
trade related ones by the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 In this benchmark model, the
optimal policy for the country is to tax non-traded goods consumption and subsidize savings,
which shifts labor into the tradable sector and suppresses consumption to increase exports.4
These policies generate the simultaneous fast growth and current account surpluses observed
in the data. These policies improve the welfare of the developing country relative to a "No
Policy" competitive equilibrium because the developing economy benets from rapid growth
due to learning-by-exporting. However, the welfare change of the developed country between
the benchmark case and the "No Policy" economy is quantitatively negligible.
If there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country has an incentive to manipulate
its terms of trade rather than distort savings. Specically, the developing country subsidizes
exports to reduce its consumption of the export good and increase consumption of the import
good. This policy generates a large deterioration in the developing economys terms of trade
and reverses the prediction for the current account. In particular, the developing economy
now runs a current account decit as it no longer relies heavily on the savings distortion to
promote exports. These policies raise the welfare of both countries relative to the benchmark
model as it generates faster economic growth in the developing economy and improvement
of the terms of trade in the developed economy, highlighting the fact that terms of trade
manipulation can be "win-win" in the presence of learning-by-exporting.
Note that the benchmark model and the No-WTO model assume a passive developed
3Since the WTO is an organization designed to liberalize international trade, it forces countries to decrease
tari¤s and export subsidies. Therefore, the WTO prevents countries from manipulating their terms of trade.
The WTO restrictions in this model represent the general state of trade rules which prevent countries from
manipulating terms of trade. For instance, a country may not be able to manipulate its terms of trade if its
trading partner can implement retaliation trade policies.
4These are consistent with current Chinese government policies. The Chinese government is taxing
the gross revenue in the service sector (Business Tax), but in the manufacturing sector, they are taxing
the di¤erence between a commoditys price and its production cost (Value Added Tax). Ping, Liang, Hao,
Zhang, and Mao (2009) shows that if the tax rate of the Business Tax is converted to that of the Value Added
Tax, it is 18.2 %. This is greater than the Value Added Tax rate of 17 %. Therefore, the Chinese government
is taxing the service sector heavier than the manufacturing sector. The non-traded goods consumption tax
is consistent with this Chinese tax regime. Savings subsidy in this model is consistent with Chinas large
government savings which were 4.4% of GDP in 1992 and 10.8% in 2007 according to Ma and Yi (2010).
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economy. This paper also considers a "Coordinated Policy" problem to obtain the rst-best
outcome for the world. In this setup, the developing countrys terms of trade deteriorate even
more and it runs a greater current account decit relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions"
case. This large deterioration of the developing countrys terms of trade causes its real
exchange rate to be undervalued. These policies reduce welfare of the developing country
and increase that of the developed country relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
However, the welfare changes of both countries between the "Coordinated Policy" case and
the "No-WTO Restrictions" economy are quantitatively modest.
This paper is motivated by three distinct lines of study. The rst consists of empirical
micro studies which show that learning-by-exporting may be quantitatively large in devel-
oping countries.5 A possible explanation is that exporters in developing countries improve
their productivity through imitation and technology spillover from developed countries.6 The
most di¢ cult task of these studies is controlling for the e¤ects of the unobserved di¤erences
in rm characteristics between exporters and non-exporters. In order to control for this
selection bias, Van Biesebroeck (2005) uses ethnicity of the owner and state ownership as
instruments, De Loecker (2007) uses matched sampling techniques based on an underlying
model of self-selection into export markets, and Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) use ex-
ogenous rm specic exchange rate shocks as instruments. These studies nd signicant
evidence of learning-by-exporting after controlling for the selection bias. Another issue re-
garding learning-by-exporting is if it can be distinguished from learning-by-doing. Blalock
and Gertler (2004), Van Biesebroeck (2005), De Loecker (2007), and De Loecker (2010) show
that there is a jump in rmsproductivity accompanied by the initiation of exporting which
cannot be explained by learning-by-doing. One might think that learning-by-importing is
5These studies include Kraay (1999), Blalock and Gertler (2004), Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2010), Park,
Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) for East Asian countries, Van Biesebroeck (2005) for Aftrican countries, De
Loecker (2007), De Loecker (2010) for Slovenia, and Fernandes and Isgut (2009) for Colombia. Harrison and
Rodríguez-Clare (2010) provide extensive reviews of the above.
6Empirical micro studies point out that learning-by-exporting also comes from exportersimproved access
to advanced production technologies, technical assistance from foreign buyers, competition with foreign rms
and higher quality standards in international markets relative to domestic markets.
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as important as learning-by-exporting. According to Keller (2004), however, there has not
been a rm estimate of the quantitative importance of learning-by-importing.
The second literature addresses "global imbalances". Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas
(2008) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) emphasize that the lack of nancial
assets in developing countries have generated capital outows. Fogli and Perri (2006) argue
that the "great moderation" (a large reduction in U.S. business cycle volatility in the early
1980s) has raised the U.S. current account decit by reducing their incentive to accumulate
precautionary savings. However, as Aguiar and Amador (2011) point out, these studies are
silent on why Latin American countries have volatile business cycles and less developed -
nancial markets, but have run current account decits. My paper provides an additional
explanation regarding the "global imbalances" and may explain why Latin American coun-
tries have run current account decits because they may implement policies which did not
take advantage of learning-by-exporting.
My paper is also related to the "allocation puzzle". Aguiar and Amador (2011) claim
that since capital will not be invested in a country with high debt, due to the risk of expro-
priation, only politically stable developing countries can grow by reducing sovereign debt and
attracting foreign capital. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) argue that the expansion
of e¢ cient private rms has made China grow rapidly. However, these rms are nancially
constrained and therefore must save for future investment, which generates Chinas current
account surplus. Guo and Perri (2010) and Song and Yang (2010) argue that atter cross-
sectional age-income prole accompanied by fast growth leads to young households saving
more, which generates the developing countriescurrent account surpluses. My paper not
only provides an additional explanation regarding this puzzle but also examines the connec-
tion between growth, current account surplus and WTO restrictions. In addition, it explores
the optimal polices in the presence of learning-by-exporting and the welfare consequences
for the growing economy and the rest of the world which were not done by previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model; Section
3 describes the calibration of the model; Section 4 discusses the results; Section 5 explains
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a "Coordinated Policy" problem and its results; Section 6 does the welfare analysis; Section
7 does a sensitivity analysis on the degree of learning-by-exporting; Section 8 concludes my
ndings.
2 Model
The model I present is a two country general equilibrium growth model. Time (t) is discrete
and runs from 0 to innity. The North country, denoted by N; corresponds to a developed
economy and owns the most developed technology. The Norths human capital stock HN
is assumed to be constant, reecting that the North has fully exhausted productivity gains
from learning-by-exporting. The South country, denoted by S; is equal to a developing
economy and has an inferior technology HSt 2

HS0 ; H
N

. Given the assumption that HN is
constant, only the South country grows through learning-by-exporting as it trades with the
North country. Each country produces one non-traded commodity and both countries share
two traded goods (z 2 f1; 2g)7. There is also an international nancial market that buys and
sells risk-free bonds bit with a return denoted by 1 + rt. Each economy is populated by rms
who produce goods and workers who provide domestic rms with labor. The South country
has a government which implements policies to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.
2.1 Firms
Country i 2 fN;Sg rms in the trade goods sector use labor nit (z) to produce output yit (z)
according to a constant returns to scale production function
yit (z) = A
i
t (z)n
i
t (z) ; i 2 fN;Sg ; z 2 f1; 2g ;
7All the results, I present using this two traded goods model, carry through in a model with a continuum
of traded goods except spikes that appear in the time path of South savings subsidy and that of South lump-
sum tax in Figures 13 and 17. These spikes are caused by discontinuities that arise when the specialization
pattern changes in the two traded goods model.
6
where
Ait (1)  H it ; Ait (2) 
 
H it
1+
;  > 0:8
Labor productivity in the trade goods sector depends on each countrys human capital.
Since  is greater than zero, the second traded commodity production is more human capital
intensive than the rst traded commodity production. The South country has a comparative
advantage in the rst traded commodity production because it has less human capital HSt <
HN :
ASt (2)
ASt (1)
=
 
HSt
1+
HSt
<
AN (2)
AN (1)
=
 
HN
1+
HN
:
Therefore, the South country exports the rst traded commodity. Labor is hired by the rms
in a competitive domestic labor market which clears at an equilibrium wage wit. Firms in
the traded goods sector maximize their prot
pt (z)A
i
t (z)n
i
t (z)  witnit (z) :
Since I assume a perfect competition in the traded goods sector, the law of one price holds.
Thus, the world price of traded commodity z is
pt(z)  w
i
t
Ait (z)
:
Since the South country produces the rst traded commodity and the North produces the
second traded commodity, the South domestic wage is
wSt =

pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)

:
8Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) show that savings wedge is a key in explaining developing countries
fast growth accompanied by current account surpluses, using the aggregate data. Since my paper looks
at questions of savings side and builds up the most parsimonious model to explain this puzzle, it does
not include capital in the model. These rapidly growing developing countries, which run current accout
surpluses, actually invest a lot but save even more. The saving side is particularly puzzling given the fast
growth. We have models of why there may be capital wedges (enforcement, for example), but few regarding
savings wedges. Including capital in the model will a¤ect the quantitative results, but the key mechanism
still stands that absent the ability to manipulate the terms of trade, learning-by-exporting calls for a savings
wedge.
7
A rm in the non-traded goods sector uses labor nit to produce output y
i
t according to a
constant returns to scale production function
yit = n
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg :
I assume that labor productivity in the non-traded goods sector is equal to one in both
countries because the focus is on productivity improvement in the traded goods sector.9 The
non-traded goods sector rm maximizes its prot
pitn
i
t   witnit:
Therefore, each countrys non-traded commodity price is
pNt = w
N
t = 1 and p
S
t = w
S
t :
The Norths wage/ non-traded good is the numeraire.
The South countrys real exchange rate is
eSt 
P St
PNt
=

pSt
pNt
1  
=
 
wSt
1  
=

pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)
1  
;
where
P it 

pit
1   
1  
pt (1)
 
 
pt (2)
(1  ) 
(1 ) 
; i 2 fN;Sg :
Since the law of one price holds in the traded goods sector, the South countrys real exchange
rate is dened by the ratio of each countrys non-traded commodity price.
2.2 Domestic Workers
A representative worker supplies labor N i inelastically for domestic rms in both non-traded
and traded goods sectors, and can trade a risk-free bond bit with the international nancial
9The U.S. labor productivity of service industry, relative to China in 1991 is 20:5475 (Data Source: BEA,
World Development Indicators, and BLS Monthly Labor Review (July 2005)): Even if I allow the productivity
in the non-traded commodity sector to di¤er across these two countries, all the qualitative results will carry
through. If the North labor productivity in non-traded goods sector is greater than that of the South, the
North produces more non-traded goods and less traded goods than before. Therefore, the South will grow
faster through learning-by-exporting because it exports more than before.
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market. The worker enjoys utility ows from consumption of a non-traded commodity cit
and two traded goods cit (z), where i 2 fN;Sg and z 2 f1; 2g : The worker discounts the
future utility with a discount factor  2 (0; 1) and has preferences:
1X
t=0
tu(Cit);
where
u(Cit) 
(Cit)
1    1
1   ;
Cit 
 
cit
1   cit (1)  cit (2)(1 ) ;  2 (0; 1) ;  2 (0; 1) :
Note that Cobb-Douglas preferences feature a unit elasticity of substitution across the non-
traded commodity and two traded goods.10 With this form of utility function, the expen-
diture share on traded goods and that on the rst traded commodity within traded goods
are equal to parameters  and , respectively. I assume that the North does not levy taxes,
so the representative worker in the North country maximizes utility subject to a budget
constraint:
1  cNt + pt(1)cNt (1) + pt(2)cNt (2) + bNt+1 = 1 NN + (1 + rt) bNt :
However, the representative worker in the South country maximizes utility subject to a
budget constraint:
 
1 + NTt

pSt c
S
t +
 
1 + EXt

pt(1)c
S
t (1)+pt(2)c
S
t (2)+b
S
t+1+Tt = w
S
t N
S +f1 + (1 +  rt ) rtg bSt :
The South government can tax or subsidize on non-traded commodity consumption
 
NTt

,
exporting commodity consumption
 
EXt

, and domestic savings ( rt ). In addition, the gov-
ernment can use a lump-sum tax or transfer (Tt).11 Note that without loss of generality I
10If I relax the unit elasticity assumption, all the qualitative results will be still valid. If I reduce the elas-
ticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, manipulating terms of trade becomes more di¢ cult.
Therefore, the developing country distorts savings more and manipulating terms of trade less. This increases
its level of current account in the No-WTO Restrictionscase.
11What I am looking at is a long run trend for the past 20 years. Since monetary policy is neutral in the
long run, I focus on real economic policies.
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normalize taxes on imports to zero.12
As the benchmark, I consider a setup in which the policies are restricted to non-trade
related ones by the WTO. Thus, in the benchmark model, I assume EXt = 0: This means
that the South government cannot directly subsidize exports or manipulate its terms of trade
pt(1)
pt(2)

. Then, I will compare the results of the benchmark model to those of a "No Policy"
competitive equilibrium
 
NTt = 
EX
t = 
r
t = Tt = 0

and the "No-WTO Restrictions" case
in which the South government can tax or subsidize on exporting commodity consumption 
EXt 6= 0

.
2.3 Law of Motion for South Human Capital
I assume the North has exhausted learning-by-exporting, so only the South country grows
through learning-by-exporting as it trades with the North country.13 The common ndings
in empirical micro studies on learning-by-exporting are that exportersproductivity improves
as their value of exports grows. This export-productivity relationship becomes stronger as
rms export to more developed countries. On the basis of these evidences, I model the degree
of learning-by-exporting as an increasing function of both the South value of exports and
the di¤erence in human capital stocks between North and South. Thus, the law of motion
for South human capital is
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


| {z }; (1)
"Learning-by-Exporting"
where
EXSt  max
 
ySt (1)  cSt (1)

; 0
	
+   p0(2)
p0(1)
max ySt (2)  cSt (2) ; 0	 :
12This is not the only way to decentralize the system. Assume that the South workers do not have access
to the international nancial market and its government trades a risk-free bond bit on behalf of workers. The
model implications for the key macroeconomic variables do not change.
13Note that the South learning-by-exporting depends on the di¤erence in human capital stocks between
North and South. If the North human capital grows over time, the South productivity gains from learning-
by-exporting are not exhausted. The South cannot converge to a steady state.
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The South human capital can grow up to HN , where  2 (0; 1) ; through learning-by-
exporting.14 The di¤erence between North and South human capital stocks is then repre-
sented by
 
HN  HSt

: The value of South exports
 
EXSt

is the weighted sum of two
traded goods exports. The parameter  2 f0; 1g determines the degree of learning-by-
exporting from the second traded commodity export. The parameter  > 0 governs the
degree of learning-by-exporting, which is a decreasing function of :
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of a set of quantities

cit; c
i
t(z); b
i
t; H
S
t
	
; a set of prices
fpit; pt(z); wit; rtg, and a set of taxes

NTt ; 
EX
t ; 
r
t ; Tt
	
, where i 2 fN;Sg and z 2 f1; 2g,
such that:
1. given prices and taxes, workers maximize utilities
2. given prices, rms maximize prots
3. the South human capital evolves according to the law of motion stated in equation (1)
4. the South government budget constraint is satised:
NTt p
S
t c
S
t + 
EX
t pt(1)c
S
t (1) + Tt = 
r
trtb
S
t
15
5. goods markets clear:
cit = y
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg ;
cNt (z) + c
S
t (z) = y
N
t (z) + y
S
t (z) ; z 2 f1; 2g
6. labor markets clear:
nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2) = N
i; i 2 fN;Sg
14The functional form, I use for the law of motion for South human capital, does not allow the South
human capital
 
HSt

to converge to HN in nite periods. Therefore, I consider that this model economy
arrives at the steady state when the South human capital
 
HSt

reaches 99% of HN .
15Without loss of generality, I assume that the government runs a balanced budget using a lump-sum tax
or transfer (Tt).
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7. bond market clears:
bSt + b
N
t = 0:
2.5 Ramsey Problem
The South government recognizes the law of motion for South human capital and imple-
ments policies in order to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.16 The South government
problems in the benchmark model and the "No-WTO Restrictions" case are the Ramsey
problem choosing a competitive equilibrium maximizing the South workers utility, given
HS0 and b
S
0 . Following the primal approach to the Ramsey problem (Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1997)), I formulate the South government problems as if the government chooses an
allocation, subject to constraints that ensure the existence of prices and taxes such that the
selected allocation is consistent with the optimizing behavior of workers and rms.
2.5.1 Benchmark
The allocation selected by the South government has to satisfy the law of motion for South
human capital, both countriesdomestic labor markets clearing conditions, and all goods
markets clearing conditions. In addition to these standard constraints, the allocation should
also satisfy: (i) the North workers optimality conditions and present-value budget constraint,
(ii) the optimality conditions of the North rms, and (iii) the WTO restrictions.
The North representative worker solves:
max
1X
t=0
tu(CNt );
subject to
1X
t=0
 
tY
i=0
1
1 + ri
!
  1  cNt + pt(1)  cNt (1) + pt(2)  cNt (2)  1 NN = bN0 :
16Note that rms do not internalize learning-by-exporting in this model. If rms recognize learning-by-
exporting, the only thing rms can do to take advantage of learning-by-exporting is dumping. However,
rms cannot use dumping because of the WTO restrictions. Therefore, governments macroeconomic policy
is important to take advantage of learning-by-exporting.
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Therefore, the North workers optimality conditions are:
ucNt+1
ucNt
=
1
1 + rt+1
;
ucNt (z)
ucNt
= pt(z); z 2 f1; 2g ;
where ucNt (z) is the North workers marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity
z 2 f1; 2g ; and ucNt is the North workers marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded
commodity.
Note that the North workers optimality conditions and present-value budget constraint
are summarized as the following implementability condition:
1X
t=0
t

ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN

= ucN0  bN0 :17
This implies that any competitive equilibrium must satisfy the North implementability con-
dition, and any allocation that satises this condition and goods market clearing conditions
can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
The optimality conditions of the North rms are summarized as follows:
if pt(z) =
ucNt (z)
ucNt
<
1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z) = 0;
if pt(z) =
ucNt (z)
ucNt
=
1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z) > 0; z 2 f1; 2g :
The rms in the North traded goods sector do not produce the traded commodity z if its
world price pt(z) is less than the rmsunit labor cost 1ANt (z)
.
The WTO restrictions are represented by
ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
ucNt (1)
ucNt (2)
:
Since the South government cannot directly subsidize exports or manipulate terms of trade
in the benchmark model, the South domestic relative price of export good to import good
pt(1)
pt(2)

is equal to the world price.
17See the appendix for the derivation of the implementability condition.
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Therefore, the South government problem in the benchmark model18 is formulated as
follows: the South government solves
max
1X
t=0
tu(CSt );
subject to
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


;
N i = nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2); c
i
t = n
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg ;
cNt (z) + c
S
t (z) = A
N
t (z)n
N
t (z) + A
S
t (z)n
S
t (z);
ucNt (z)
ucNt
 1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z)  0; nSt (z)  0; z 2 f1; 2g ;
1X
t=0
t

ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN

= ucN0  bN0 ;
ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
ucNt (1)
ucNt (2)
:
2.5.2 No WTO Restrictions
If there were no WTO restrictions, the allocation chosen by the South government has to sat-
isfy all constraints of the benchmark model above except the last equation

u
cSt (1)
u
cSt (2)
=
u
cNt (1)
u
cNt (2)

.
Therefore, the "No-WTO Restrictions" problem drops the last constraint. Since the South
government can manipulate terms of trade, the South domestic relative price of export good
to import good

pt(1)
pt(2)

can be di¤erent from the world price.
3 Calibration
This section explains how I set parameter values of the benchmark model economy. I inter-
pret the North country as the U.S. and the South country as China. A set of parameters
are adopted from related literature and the U.S. data. The model period is one year. The
discount factor  is set at 0:96; which implies 4% real interest rate per annum at the steady
18See the appendix for the computation algorithm used to solve the benchmark model.
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state, and the preference parameter ; which determines the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, is set at 2: The expenditure share on traded goods  is 0:2438; which is the average
U.S. GDP share of traded goods sector19 from 1991 to 200720 and the parameter  is set
at 0:551621 so that the expenditure share on the rst traded commodity ( ) matches the
average U.S. imports to GDP ratio from 1991 to 2007 (0:1345) 22: Among parameters re-
lated to the law of motion for South human capital, the parameter ; which determines the
South human capital at the steady state, is 0:99 in order to prevent multiple solutions.23
The parameter ; which determines the degree of learning-by-exporting from the second
traded commodity export, is set at zero. If  is equal to one, a discontinuity appears due
to max
 
ySt (2)  cSt (2)

; 0
	
of the law of motion for South human capital. This creates a
spike in the time path of aggregates when the South country starts to produce the second
traded commodity. However, the main results and implications of the model are still valid.
Both the North
 
NN

and the South
 
NS

labors are normalized to 1, and the South initial
debt
 
bS0

is set at 0.
The remaining parameters are chosen so that the model can replicate relevant data mo-
ments of the U.S. and China. The South initial human capital HS0 , the North human capital
HN , and the parameter ; which governs the labor productivity in the second traded com-
modity production, are selected so that the model matches three targets: (i) Chinas labor
productivity of manufacturing industry relative to service industry in 1991 (0:5269) 24; (ii) the
19Following Stockman and Tesar (1995), the traded goods sector includes agricultural, manufacturing,
mining, retail, and transportation sectors.
20Data Source: BEA.
21This is a lower bound of the rst traded commodity expenditure share in traded goods consumption,
because I assume that the U.S. does not produce the imported goods. A sensitivity analysis found that the
main results are robust to the value of parameter :
22Data Source: World Development Indicators.
23If  is equal to one, the comparative advantage disappears at the steady state
 
HSt = H
N

; leading
to multiple solutions. The parameter  determines the South human capital at the steady state. If we
reduce the value of , the South steady state human capital decreases and the growth rate of its human
capital declines because of the reduced di¤erence in human capital stocks between North and South. All the
qualitative results are still valid.
24Data Source: World Development Indicators and BLS Monthly Labor Review (July 2005).
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U.S. labor productivity of manufacturing industry relative to China in 1991 (44:1379) 25; and
(iii) the U.S. relative labor productivity of exporters in 1992 (1:169) calculated by Bernard
and Jensen (1999). The parameter , which governs the degree of learning-by-exporting are
chosen so that the model matches the average growth rate of Chinas real GDP per capita
relative to the U.S. from 1991 to 2007 (0:0752) 26. The degree of learning-by-exporting under
this calibration implies that if the South countrys export increases by 10%, its productivity
rises by 12:91%. This is in line with micro estimates for China.27 The parameter values
are summarized in Table 1. I use the same parameters for the "No-Policy" and "No-WTO
Restrictions" cases as in the benchmark economy.
4 Results
This section explains the quantitative results and is organized as follows: Subsection 4.1 ex-
plains the results of the benchmark model and compares them to the observed data patterns;
Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 present the results of the "No-Policy" economy and the "No-WTO
Restrictions" case in comparison with those of the benchmark, respectively.
4.1 Benchmark
The period 0 corresponds to the year 1991. When the South government cannot use export
subsidy
 
EXt = 0

due to WTO restrictions, the optimal policy for the South country is to
tax non-traded goods consumption and subsidize savings as shown in Figure 3. This shifts
labor into the tradable sector and suppresses its overall consumption to increase exports.
Figure 4 shows that the South government initially shifts labor into the tradable sector
by suppressing consumption of non-traded commodity. As the South human capital grows
through learning-by-exporting, it gradually raises its labor allocation to the non-traded com-
modity sector and therefore its consumption. Figure 5 shows that the South government
25Data Source: BEA, World Development Indicators, and BLS Monthly Labor Review (July 2005).
26Data Source: Penn World Table.
27For instance, Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010) show that if a rm experiences an exogenous 10%
increase in exports, its productivity rises by 11% to 13% in China.
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suppresses consumption of the export good (Traded Commodity 1) while reducing that of
the import good (Traded Commodity 2) for the initial periods. This raises the South export,
leading its human capital and real GDP to grow rapidly through learning-by-exporting as
shown in Figures 4 and 6. The transition to the steady state takes 112 periods, during which
the North produces both traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity.28
The initial pattern of export and import of the South causes the country to run a current
account surplus, amid a rapid growth in its real GDP as shown in Figure 6.29 During the
transition, the South terms of trade stay constant. Note that when one country produces
both traded goods, the terms of trade are determined by its productivity ratio between
two traded goods production. Since the North produces both traded goods for all periods,
the South terms of trade are equal to the North productivity ratio between two traded
goods

pt(1)
pt(2)
=
(HN)
1+
HN

. This is equal to the U.S. relative labor productivity of exporters
in 1992 (1:169). The constant South terms of trade makes the South real exchange rate
appreciate as its human capital grows. This is because the South real exchange rate is a
function of its terms of trade and relative productivity in traded commodity production
eSt 
n
pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)
o1  
. These simultaneous growth and real exchange rate appre-
ciation are consistent with the Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) hypothesis30.
Table 2 summarizes the average values of key aggregates of the U.S. and China from
1991 to 2007 and their counterparts in the benchmark model. The model is calibrated to
28As I describe in Subsections 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2, the South produces the second traded commodity during
the latter part of the transition in the "No Policy", "No-WTO Restrictions", and "Coordinated Policy"
cases. This is because initially the South runs a substantial current account decit. In order to repay the
interests on its debt, the South shifts more workers from non-tradable sector to both tradable sectors so that
it runs a trade surplus for the rest of the transition periods.
29As can be seen in Figure 2, Chinas current account surplus has increased over time. However, in this
model, the South current account surplus is decreasing over time.
In the real world, the Chinese government could have gradually implemented policies to take advantage
of learning-by-exporting. However, since this is a perfect foresight model, the South does not gradually
implement policies. In order to match the trend, I should introduce some frictions like adjustment costs into
this model.
30Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) argue that economic growth driven by productivity gains in the
traded goods sector should accompany a real exchange rate appreciation.
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match the average growth rate of Chinas real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. (7:52%).
As shown in Table 2, the South policies generate the simultaneous fast growth and current
account surpluses observed in the data.31 In addition, the benchmark model replicates both
Chinas export over GDP and the appreciation of its real exchange rate as in the data.
4.2 No Policy Counterfactual
In the "No-Policy" economy, both rms and workers know that the South human capital will
grow over time but no one recognizes the law of motion for South human capital. Therefore,
they do not have an incentive to raise the South export in order to take advantage of learning-
by-exporting. If no policies were implemented in both the North and South countries, the
transition to the steady state takes 118 periods as shown in Figure 7. This is 6 periods
longer than that of the benchmark economy because no one implements policies to accelerate
the South growth through learning-by-exporting in the "No-Policy" economy. During the
transition, the patterns of specialization in production undergo three stages: (i) the North
produces both traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity for the rst
96 periods; (ii) both countries are completely specialized in period 97; and (iii) the South
starts to produce the second traded commodity in period 98.
Figure 7 shows that more South workers produce in the non-traded commodity sector for
the initial 85 periods relative to the benchmark case, because the South labor productivity
in the rst traded commodity production is much less than that in non-traded commodity
production over the same periods in the "No-Policy" world. This initially suppresses the
South rst traded commodity export although its consumption for the rst traded commodity
is less than in the benchmark economy as shown in Figure 8, delaying the take-o¤of its human
capital relative to the benchmark case.
31This model overstates Chinas current account surplus and understates the U.S. current account decit.
However, what is important is the qualitative result that the model can replicate the sign of current accounts
of both countries. In reality, both countries have other trading partners than each other. The discrepancy
between current account generated by the model and its data counterpart may come from each countrys
trade with the rest of the world.
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In the "No-Policy" economy, since the South workers know that their income will grow in
the future, they want to raise current consumption. The South consumes more non-traded
goods in the rst 85 periods than in the benchmark economy, leading to a larger aggregate
consumption. This makes the South current account decit32 increase for the same periods.
The South workers move from non-tradable sector to both tradable sectors for the rest of the
transition periods so that the South runs a trade surplus in order to repay the interests on its
debt.33 Since more workers produce in both traded commodity sectors in the South country
relative to the benchmark economy beginning in period 86, the level of South real GDP
becomes greater than that in the benchmark case as Figure 9 presents. This is because labor
productivity in the traded goods production is higher than that in non-traded commodity
production over the same period. Figure 9 shows that the South terms of trade start to
deteriorate in period 97 when both countries are completely specialized.34 Beginning in
period 98 when the South produces both traded goods, its terms of trade, which are equal
to the South productivity ratio

(HSt )
1+
HSt

; improves as its human capital grows. For the
same period, the real exchange rate appreciates following the South human capital growth.
4.3 No WTO Restrictions
If there were no WTO restrictions
 
EXt 6= 0

, the South country can directly subsidize
exports. Figure 10 shows that the transition to the steady state takes 70 periods but the most
catch-up takes place for the initial 50 periods. During the transition, the North produces
both traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity for the rst 26 periods.
As the South human capital grows, it gradually expands the world market share of the rst
traded commodity. In period 27, the South completely takes over the market for the rst
traded commodity, which leads to complete specialization of both countries until period 34.
32The size of the current account decits is implausible. This is caused by the full commitment and perfect
foresight assumptions.
33The right panel of Figure 8 shows that the South exports even the second traded commodity from period
100 in spite of a comparative disadvantage.
34The South terms of trade in the benchmark model is normalized to 1 in Figures 9, 12, and 16.
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The South starts to produce the second traded commodity in period 35.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 11, the South government suppresses consump-
tion of the export good (Traded Commodity 1) during the transition relative to benchmark
outcomes. This raises the South export, making its human capital grow faster through
learning-by-exporting relative to the benchmark economy. Figure 10 shows that the South
government shifts more workers from the non-traded commodity sector to both traded goods
sectors, than in the benchmark economy. Since labor productivity in both traded goods pro-
duction is higher than that in non-traded commodity production, the level of South real GDP
in "No-WTO Restrictions" case is greater than that in the benchmark economy beginning
in period 11. The right panel of Figure 11 shows that the South substitutes the alternative
import by raising consumption of the import good (Traded Commodity 2) substantially for
the initial periods. As the South accumulates human capital through learning-by-exporting,
its imports decline to the level which is even below that in the benchmark after period 35
when the South starts to produce the second traded commodity.
The increased South import initially causes the country to run a large current account
decit. As the South import declines, the current account decit also goes down and ul-
timately becomes balanced in the steady state. The South governments export subsidy
generates a deterioration in its terms of trade

pt(1)
pt(2)

beginning in period 27 when both
countries start to be completely specialized, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 12. When
the North produces both traded goods for the initial 26 periods, the South terms of trade are
equal to the North productivity ratio between two traded goods

(HN)
1+
HN

, which is time-
invariant. When the South produces both traded goods beginning in period 35, its terms of
trade are equivalent to its productivity ratio

(HSt )
1+
HSt

; which rises with the South human
capital.
Figure 13 shows that if there were no WTO restrictions, the South country will use an
export subsidy for the initial 34 periods instead of non-traded commodity consumption tax
and it no longer relies heavily on the savings subsidy to promote exports. The switch of sign
in the current account from the benchmark to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case implies that
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ideally the South would like to manipulate its terms of trade rather than its current account.
However, if the ability to explicitly subsidize exports is absent due to the WTO restrictions,
it must "over" distort both the intertemporal margin and the non-traded margin.
5 Coordinated Policy Problem
In this section, I consider a "Coordinated Policy" problem in which the North and South
could coordinate policies, in order to obtain the rst-best outcome for the world. I assume
that there is a ctitious world planner who maximizes the weighted average of both the
North and South utilities by taking advantage of the South countrys learning-by-exporting.
The world planner solves
max
1X
t=0
t

u(CSt ) + (1  )u(CNt )
	
;
subject to
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


;
cit = n
i
t; N
i = nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2); i 2 fN;Sg ;
cSt (z) + c
N
t (z) = A
S
t (z)n
S
t (z) + A
N (z)nNt (z);
nSt (z)  0; nNt (z)  0; z 2 f1; 2g ;
where  2 [0; 1] is the South countrys Pareto weight.
If the South country exports the traded commodity z 2 f1; 2g, the world utility maxi-
mizing behavior of the planner implies the following rst-order conditions:
ucSt (z)  
t
 
HN  HSt


exp

 EX
S
t


= (1  )ucNt (z); (2)
ucSt (z)  ASt (z) = ucSt  1; (3)
where t is a multiplier for the law of motion for South human capital, ucit(z) is the country
is marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity z; and ucit is the country is
marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded commodity. Note that the second term in
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the left side of the condition (2),
t(HN HSt )

exp

 EXSt


; which appears due to learning-
by-exporting, is positive. This implies that when the South country exports the traded
commodity z, the world planner reduces the South countrys consumption for the exporting
good cSt (z) in order to take advantage of learning-by-exporting. The condition (3) shows
that there is no distortion between the South consumption for the export good and that of
non-traded good. If a worker shifts from the non-traded commodity sector to the traded
commodity z sector in the South country, this reduces one unit of non-traded commodity.
Thus, the welfare loss is marginal utility of consumption for the non-traded commodity.
However, the worker produces ASt (z) units of the traded commodity z and by consuming
it, the worker can enjoy marginal utility of consumption for the commodity times marginal
product
 
ASt (z)

. Since the South country does not export the traded commodity z but
consumes it, there is no additional welfare gain from learning-by-exporting.35 The conditions
(2) and (3) imply that the planner decreases not only the South countrys consumption for
the export good but also that for non-traded good. This means that the planner raises the
South exports by reducing its consumption of domestically produced goods and increasing
consumption of the import good.
5.1 Decentralization
In this subsection, I explain the way I nd prices and wedges, which imply the rst-best
allocation for the world. The North countrys non-traded commodity price is normalized
to one. Since the Norths relative consumptions across goods are undistorted, I use their
marginal rate of substitution between non-traded and traded goods as the world prices. The
35Note that non-traded goods consumption tax is needed in the presence of WTO restrictions. If a worker
shifts from the non-traded commodity sector to the export commodity sector in the South country, this
reduces one unit of non-traded commodity. Thus, the welfare loss is marginal utility of consumption for
the non-traded commodity. However, the worker produces marginal product of the export commodity and
consumes part of that while exporting the remaining part to increase the import commodity consumption.
This way, the terms of trade are kept constant. Since the South country exports some of the increased export
commodity, there is additional welfare gain from learning-by-exporting.
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world price pt(z) of traded commodity z is dened by
pt(z) 
ucNt (z)
ucNt
; z 2 f1; 2g ;
where ucit(z) is the country is marginal utility of consumption for the traded commodity z
and ucit is the country is marginal utility of consumption for its non-traded commodity. The
world interest rate rt+1 is dened by
rt+1 
ucNt
  ucNt+1
  1:
Since the South country has a comparative advantage in the rst traded commodity pro-
duction, it produces the rst traded commodity and the North produces the second traded
commodity. Therefore, the South domestic wage is dened by
wSt 

pt(1)
pt(2)



ASt (1)
AN (2)

= pSt :
A wedge  rt+1 in the South countrys domestic interest rate, a wedge 
EX
t in the South
domestic relative price of export good to import good, and a wedge NTt in the South
domestic relative price of export good to non-traded good are dened by
 rt+1 
wSt+1  ucSt
rt+1  wSt    ucSt+1
  1
rt+1
  1 () w
S
t+1  ucSt
wSt    ucSt+1
  1 =  1 +  rt+1 rt+1;
EXt 
pt(2)  ucSt (1)
pt(1)  ucSt (2)
  1 () ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
 
1 + EXt

pt(1)
pt(2)
;
NTt 
ucSt
ASt (1)  ucSt (1)
  1 () ucSt (1)
ucSt
=
pt(1)
(1 + NTt ) p
S
t
=
1
(1 + NTt )A
S
t (1)
:
5.2 Results
I use the same parameters for the "Coordinated Policy" case as in the benchmark economy,
except for the South Pareto weight  = 0:3314 which is chosen so that the model matches
the balanced steady state current account.36
When both the North and South coordinate policies to achieve the world best allocation,
the transition to the steady state takes 64 periods as Figure 14 presents. This is 6 periods
36If  is greater than 0:3314, the South runs a current account decit at the steady state. If  is less than
0:3314, it runs a current account surplus at the steady state.
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less than that of "No-WTO Restrictions" economy because the world planner facilitates
growth through terms of trade distortion even more. During the transition, the patterns
of specialization in production undergo three stages as before: (i) the North produces both
traded goods and the South produces the rst traded commodity for the rst 24 periods; (ii)
both countries are completely specialized from period 25 to 34; and (iii) the South starts to
produce the second traded commodity in period 35. The rst stage gets shorter relative to
the "No-WTO Restrictions" case.
The left panel of Figure 15 shows that the world planner reduces the South consumption
of the export good (Traded Commodity 1) even more from period 19 than in the "No-WTO
Restrictions" economy. This increases the South export, making its human capital grow
more rapidly through learning-by-exporting than in the "No-WTO Restrictions" case. As
can be seen in Figure 14, the world planner moves more workers from non-traded commodity
sector to both traded commodity sectors in the South country relative to the "No-WTO Re-
strictions" economy beginning in period 25. This makes the level of South real GDP greater
than that in "No-WTO Restrictions" case over the same period because labor productivity
in the traded goods production is higher than that in non-traded commodity production.
The right panel of Figure 15 shows that, for the initial periods, the world planner raises the
South import by 43% of its GDP relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" world by increasing
its consumption of the import good (Traded Commodity 2).
This di¤erence in the South import between "Coordinated Policy" and "No-WTO Re-
strictions" economies initially leads to a larger current account decit (43% of the South
GDP) relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case. Figure 16 shows that beginning in pe-
riod 25 when both countries start to be completely specialized, the increase of South export
deteriorates its terms of trade

pt(1)
pt(2)

much more than in the "No-WTO Restrictions" econ-
omy. This large deterioration of the South terms of trade causes its real exchange rate to
be undervalued from period 25 to 34, as shown in Figure 16. Over the same period, the
South real GDP grows rapidly due to the fast growth of its human capital which implies
a rapid productivity improvement in traded goods sector. These simultaneous growth and
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undervaluation contrast with the prediction of the Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) hypoth-
esis. When the South produces both traded goods beginning in period 35, its terms of trade
pt(1)
pt(2)
=
(HSt )
1+
HSt

improve due to the growth of South human capital. For the same period,
the real exchange rate appreciates following the real GDP growth. This implies that the
world planner postpones the Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) e¤ect by deteriorating the
South terms of trade.
Figure 17 shows that the world planner uses a bigger export subsidy and a less saving
subsidy relative to the "No-WTO Restrictions" case. This implies that the world planner
calls for more terms of trade manipulation than the No-WTO policies.
6 Welfare Analysis
This paper explores optimal policies in the presence of learning-by-exporting in various
environments: with the WTO restrictions, with no restrictions, and under the policy coordi-
nation. An interesting question is what are the welfare consequences of those policies for the
developing and developed economies. In order to answer this question, I measure the welfare
changes due to moving from the benchmark economy with the WTO restrictions to another
environment using the percentage change in per-period consumption that I should give to
the worker in each country in the benchmark so that the worker is indi¤erent between the
two environments.
In the "No-Policy" economy, no one recognizes the positive externality from learning-by-
exporting and no policy is implemented to facilitate export-led growth. On the other hand,
in the benchmark model, the South government, which recognizes learning-by-exporting,
has an incentive to implement policies to increase exports. Since it cannot directly subsidize
exports due to WTO restrictions, it taxes non-traded goods consumption and subsidizes
savings as an alternative. This policy enables the South country to grow faster, benetting
its workers, than in the "No-Policy" world. Moving from the "No-Policy" world to the
benchmark economy, the welfare of the North country slightly decreases. The importance
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of the policy implemented in the benchmark economy is measured by welfare changes from
the benchmark economy to the "No-Policy" world in Table 3. These welfare changes are
equivalent to 19:10% decline and 0:06% increase in per-period consumption of the South and
the North, respectively.
If the South country is allowed to manipulate its terms of trade ("No-WTO Restrictions"
case), both the North and South benet from welfare improvement relative to the benchmark
economy. Without restrictions on the policies, the South country subsidizes exports to
reduce its consumption of the export good and increase consumption of the import good.
This policy generates a large deterioration in the South terms of trade and a current account
decit. These policies make the South grow faster without raising savings heavily to promote
exports, which improves the welfare of the South relative to the benchmark economy. In the
"No-WTO Restrictions" world, the North welfare also increases due to improved terms of
trade compared with the benchmark economy. This "win-win" outcome through the terms
of trade manipulation is reected in the welfare gains of 14:08% and 0:43% rises in per-
period consumption of the South and the North, respectively. This contrasts with Bagwell
and Staiger (1999)s view that the WTO improves the world welfare by preventing zero-sum
terms of trade manipulation.37
As shown in Table 3, if both countries coordinate policies to achieve the world best al-
location, both countrieswelfare rises signicantly compared with the benchmark economy.
The ctitious world planner manipulates the terms of trade of both countries so that the
South grows faster through learning-by-exporting. This leads to the welfare gains equivalent
to 13:24% and 1:16% increases in per-period consumption of the South and the North, re-
spectively. However, moving from the "No-WTO Restrictions" economy to the "Coordinated
Policy" world, the North is better o¤whereas the South is worse o¤. The world planner pulls
down the relative price of the South export good to its import good even more than in the
37There may be other reasons that the WTO restrictions improve the welfare of developing countries.
For instance, Bajona and Chu (2010) claim that the WTO restrictions increase Chinas welfare by reducing
subsidies to the ine¢ cient state-owned sector.
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"No-WTO Restrictions" economy. Even though this makes the South country grow faster,
the larger deterioration of the South terms of trade hurts its welfare. On the other hand,
the North benets from its improved terms of trade. However, the welfare changes of both
countries between "No-WTO Restrictions" case and the "Coordinated Policy" economy are
quantitatively modest.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
I do a sensitivity analysis on the degree of learning-by-exporting. The degree of learning-
by-exporting is measured by a rise in a rms productivity accompanied by a 10% increase
in exports. According to Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2010), a rms productivity increases
by 11% to 13% in China, if it experiences an exogenous 10% rise in exports. Table 4 shows
that if I use the lowest value of the micro estimate on the degree of learning-by-exporting,
which is 11%, the benchmark model still generates the simultaneous fast growth and current
account surplus of the South country. However, the levels of both the average growth rate
of Chinas real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. and Chinas current account over GDP
decrease relative to the benchmark calibration in which the degree of learning-by-exporting
is 12:91%. If the degree of learning-by-exporting is about one tenth of the highest value of
micro estimate, that is, 1:38%, the South does not need to run a current account surplus to
take advantage of learning-by-exporting. This result shows that the cross-country di¤erences
in the degree of learning-by-exporting may explain the heterogeneity in the pattern of current
account across developing countries.
8 Conclusion
This paper examines if a popular concept, learning-by-exporting rationalizes the key macro-
economic behavior of fast growing developing countries. This paper also explores what
policies exploit learning-by-exporting, their implications for aggregates like the current ac-
count and the real exchange rate, the welfare consequences for the growing economy and the
27
rest of the world, and if restricting the set of policies to non-trade related policies matter.
In order to answer these questions, this paper builds a two country general equilibrium
growth model in which a developing economy benets from learning-by-exporting as it trades
with a developed economy. If the policies are restricted to non-trade related ones by the
WTO, the optimal policy for the developing country is to tax non-traded goods consumption
and subsidize savings, which rationalize the observed current account surpluses of rapidly
growing developing economies. This policy improves the welfare of developing country rela-
tive to a "No-Policy" competitive equilibrium.
If there were no WTO restrictions, the developing country directly subsidizes exports.
This policy generates a large deterioration in the developing economys terms of trade and
reverses the prediction for the current account. This policy raises the welfare of both coun-
tries relative to the model with WTO restrictions, as it generates faster economic growth in
the developing economy and improvement of the terms of trade in the developed economy.
This paper also considers a Coordinated Policyproblem to obtain the rst-best outcomes
for the world. In this setup, the developing countrys terms of trade deteriorate even more
and it runs a greater current account decit relative to the No-WTO Restrictionscase.
This paper not only provides an additional explanation regarding "global imbalances"
but also investigates the connection between growth, current account surplus and WTO
restrictions. In addition, it explores the optimal polices in the presence of learning-by-
exporting and the welfare consequences for the growing economy and the rest of the world
which were not done by previous studies.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the Implementability Condition
The North representative worker solves:
max
1X
t=0
tu(CNt );
subject to
1X
t=0
 
tY
i=0
1
1 + ri
!
  1  cNt + pt(1)  cNt (1) + pt(2)  cNt (2)  1 NN = bN0 : (4)
The workers rst order conditions are:
ucNt+1
ucNt
=
1
1 + rt+1
;
ucNt (z)
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= pt(z); z 2 f1; 2g :
Plugging the above rst order conditions into the North workers present-value budget con-
straint (4) yields
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i=1
ucNi
ucNi 1
!

 
1  cNt +
ucNt (1)
ucNt
 cNt (1) +
ucNt (2)
ucNt
 cNt (2)  1 NN
!
= bN0 :
Since ucNi s; i 2 f1; 2;    ; t  1g are canceled out in
 
tY
i=1
u
cN
i
u
cN
i 1
!
, I have
1X
t=0
 
tucNt
ucN0
!

 
1  cNt +
ucNt (1)
ucNt
 cNt (1) +
ucNt (2)
ucNt
 cNt (2)  1 NN
!
= bN0 : (5)
Multiplying both sides of equation (5) by ucN0 , I obtain the implementability condition
1X
t=0
t 

ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN

= ucN0  bN0 : (6)
B Computation Algorithm
The following algorithm is used to solve the benchmark model.
1. Guess the Lagrangian multiplier  of the implementability condition (6).
29
2. Given  and bN0 = 0, solve the following value function using value function iterations
and obtain the optimal decision rules:
V (HSt ;)
 max
24 u(CSt ) + ucNt  cNt + ucNt (1)  cNt (1) + ucNt (2)  cNt (2)  ucNt NN
+V (HSt+1;)
35 ;
subject to
HSt+1 = H
S
t +
 
HN  HSt

1  exp

 EX
S
t


;
N i = nit + n
i
t(1) + n
i
t(2); c
i
t = n
i
t; i 2 fN;Sg ;
cNt (z) + c
S
t (z) = A
N
t (z)n
N
t (z) + A
S
t (z)n
S
t (z);
ucNt (z)
ucNt
 1
ANt (z)
; nNt (z)  0; nSt (z)  0; z 2 f1; 2g ;
ucSt (1)
ucSt (2)
=
ucNt (1)
ucNt (2)
:
3. Using the optimal decision rules, simulate for a transition to a steady state.
4. Check if the implementability condition (6) is satised. If not, go to Step 1 and repeat
the above procedure.
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Table 1: Parameter Values of the Benchmark Model Economy
Parameter Description
 = 0:96 Discount factor
1= = 0:5 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
 = 0:2438 Expenditure share on traded goods
 = 0:5516 Expenditure share on the rst traded commodity ( )
 = 0:99 South human capital at the steady state
 
HN

 = 0 Degree of learning-by-exporting from the second traded commodity export
NN = 1 The North countrys labor
NS = 1 The South countrys labor
bS0 = 0 The South countrys initial debt
HS0 = 0:5269 The South countrys initial human capital
HN = 19:8941 The North countrys human capital
 = 0:0522 Labor productivity in the second traded commodity production
 = 33:8927 Degree of learning-by-exporting
Table 2: Average of Aggregate Variables from 1991 to 2007 (Unit: %)
Variable Data Model
Growth rate of Chinas real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. 7:52 7:52
Chinas current account over GDP 3:12 10:99
U.S. current account over GDP  6:00  0:85
Chinas export over GDP 25:22 23:67
Appreciation rate of Chinas real exchange rate 1:46 9:34
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Table 3: Welfare Gain or Loss (Unit: Per-Period Consumption)
South North
Benchmark =) No Policy  19:10% +0:06%
Benchmark =) No WTO +14:08% +0:43%
Benchmark =) Coordinated Policy +13:24% +1:16%
No WTO =) Coordinated Policy  0:74% +0:73%
Table 4: Impact of Degree of Learning-by-Exporting
Variable (Unit: %) Data
Degree of
Learning-by-Exporting
BM 11:00 1:38
Growth rate of
China rel. GDPPC
7:52 7:52 4:52 0:15
China CA over GDP 3:12 10:99 6:52  21:01
U.S. CA over GDP  6:00  0:85  0:36 0:58
China EX over GDP 25:22 23:67 20:60 3:25
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Figure 1: Chinas Exports and Economic Growth
Figure 2: Current Account Imbalances of the U.S. and China
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Figure 3: Time Path of South Tax and Subsidy (Benchmark)
Figure 4: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark)
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Figure 5: Time Path of South Consumption and Export (Benchmark)
Figure 6: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark)
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Figure 7: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark and No-Policy)
Figure 8: Time Path of South Consumption and Export (Benchmark and No-Policy)
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Figure 9: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark and No-Policy)
Figure 10: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark and No-WTO)
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Figure 11: Time Path of South Consumption and Export (Benchmark and No-WTO)
Figure 12: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark and No-WTO)
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Figure 13: Time Path of South Tax and Subsidy (Benchmark and No-WTO)
Figure 14: Time Path of South Human Capital and Labor (Benchmark, No-WTO, and
Coordinated Policy)
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Figure 15: Time Path of South Consumption and Export (Benchmark, No-WTO, and Co-
ordinated Policy)
Figure 16: Time Path of South Key Aggregates (Benchmark, No-WTO, and Coordinated
Policy)
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Figure 17: Time Path of South Tax and Subsidy (Benchmark, No-WTO, and Coordinated
Policy)
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